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Abstract 
 
This article aims to analyze the potential of Iranian ports for carrying some containerized cargo, from 
the Far East to the European Union, which is usually transported via traditional shipping routes. The idea 
of diverting cargo via an “Iran route” emerged from an examination of economic, trade and maritime 
transportation trends and events. This study presents a new idea for a freight route, designed in four 
segments for the benefit of the carrier. In order to make assumptions about the future in what are 
undisputedly widespread uncertain conditions, a scenario method has been employed. Following this a 
plausible future plan for a new terminal has been developed taking into account geographical, technical 
and economic themes for serving the container transit market until 2011. 
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Introduction 
 
This article aims to analyse the potential role of Iranian ports for carrying a part of 
containerized cargo, which under present circumstances would be transported via 
‘traditional’ shipping routes. By considering the shorter Iranian route in linking the 
European Union and Asia in terms of time and cost in comparison with the traditional 
shipping route, the scenario of a ‘route via Iran’ is proposed. This scenario reflects a 
way to extend the global supply chain and accelerate integration of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern European countries into the globalization 
process.  
Iran, as a historical transit route, could play a new role in the changing world. After 
1985 an increasing amount of containerized cargo has been transported between South 
East Asia and Western Europe. In this study, a scenario analysis was employed as a 
research tool to generate a ‘route via-Iran’ scenario. In order to generate such a scenario, 
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micro and macro economic events, and ports, shipping and hinterland trends were taken 
into account. At a later stage, economic benefits and costs of diverting a share of transit 
cargo via the Iran route will be assessed.  
The Iranian economy is very much dependent upon natural resources (in particular oil 
and gas) and therefore the degree of diversification is low. It is important for the country 
to search for opportunities and new ways to tackle its economic problems (manifested in 
high unemployment, an undiversified income source, and in a broad sense shortage of 
competitiveness) in order to establish itself as an important player in the global 
economy. The comparative advantages of an Iranian route, as opposed to the traditional 
ocean shipping route, are used as a theoretical basis to generate the scenario for this 
study. This scenario indicates that from a global perspective, it is possible to decrease 
costs and increase competitiveness due to the resulting shorter voyage time and 
consequent lower costs when using a transit route through Iran. This scenario leads to 
an assumption that because of Iran’s comparative advantages in the foreseeable future, 
the Far East-European transit business could become one of the major commercial 
services in the country. 
 
 
Research methodology 
 
Scenario planning was deployed as the principal research method. It was developed at 
the California Rand Corporation for military use after World War II, and then was 
adapted by Kahn in 1960s as a more general business tool. Its most prominent 
utilization was carried out by Wack and Newland at Royal Dutch/Shell in the 1970’s, 
when they examined the impact on oil prices in a number of potential scenarios. 
Van der Werff (1998) described scenario planning as a method which can provide 
answers to ‘What if...?’ questions when the circumstances involve important issues and 
large external influences. Unlike strategic planning, which postulates a single 
anticipated future, scenario planning looks at alternative versions of the future. The goal 
of scenario planning is to ‘enrich management's thinking, perceptions of reality, and 
modes of decision making when addressing important issues in the face of uncertainties’ 
(Van der Werff, 1998). Kahn (1965) as a pioneer of scenario planning defined it as 
‘hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on 
causal processes and decision points’ (p129).  
Kleiner (1995) added that ‘contrary to what many people believe about scenario 
exercises, their purpose is not prediction. You don’t predict what will happen: you posit 
several potential futures (…). A scenario planning exercise is a bit like a storytelling 
workshop, set up to bring forth distinction and phenomena that the conventional 
wisdom ignores’ (p275).  
A scenario can emerge through rational trends and events or be created by its 
variables and their outcomes under uncertain conditions. Generally, scenario creation 
consists of three main steps - scenario generation, scenario development and scenario 
contraction.  
In the first phase of scenario creation, the main developments of Iran’s economy, 
trade, shipping, ports and their hinterland are considered. They are identified as scenario 
variables. The scenario notes the sphere of changes and a range of possible futures. In 
the second phase, according to the long term and operational environments of the story, 
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some themes are deliberately exaggerated. These themes are usually derived using 
Finlay’s DEEPLIST (Demographic, Environment, Economic, Politics, Legal, 
Information, Social and Technology) method, which requires developing each theme 
through analyzing the present taken on into the future (Finlay, 2000). 
The scenario planning method has been used by many researchers in the field of 
transport research. Some examples include Banister (1998), Bavarsad (1997) and 
Darzentas (1996); they all applied scenario planning to model a transportation system. 
 
 
Scenario generation phase 
 
Global maritime supply chain factors 
 
It is quite clear that all transportation systems are affected by both internal and 
external factors. Internal factors affect the transportation system directly and include 
developments in transport technology, engine advancement, control systems, 
deregulation, containerization etc. External variables, which are most commonly 
dependent upon the global economy, are also very important and can have a very 
significant effect upon technological, social and integration concepts within the 
transportation system.  
In the maritime supply chain, both internal and external factors are equally important, 
because a seaport serves as a link between the shipping industry and the port’s 
hinterland. Both, the shipping infrastructure and the port hinterland are potential port 
customers and each is affected by forces in the national as well as the global economy. 
Scenario creation for the maritime transport sector is generally based upon this structure 
(Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scenario creation for the maritime sector. 
Source: Authors.  
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Economic events and trends 
 
Globalisation and international trade 
 
Globalization as a term was developed in the industrial world and has stemmed from 
intense competition, because the omission of trade barriers, emerging multi-national 
companies and tendencies to sign regional agreements has led to intense competition 
among suppliers. As a result the movement of goods, information flows and financial 
operations has become an inseparable part of this process. Globalization means different 
things to different people. In its broadest sense, the term encompasses all types of 
economic and cultural transfers between nations – including domination of the media 
and widespread use of the World Wide Web. In a narrower sense, it refers to the 
economic exchange of goods and services internationally and international financial 
flows. Generally it could be said that globalization of economics has led to the 
construction of a world market. It also refers to the production and distribution of 
products and services of a homogeneous type and quality on a world-wide basis. 
During the past few decades, world trade has been growing faster than the world’s 
GDP, which implies that an increasing share of the world’s output crosses international 
borders (Oman, 1994). Meanwhile, trade barriers have declined substantially as a result 
of successive trade negotiation rounds under the auspices of the GATT/WTO, unilateral 
trade liberalization and regional trade agreements. Integration of economics and a high 
rate of interchange have led to the situation where the growth of world trade twice 
exceeds the world GDP growth (WTO, 2002). 
From 1955 until 2000, overall world export trade in merchandise increased almost 65 
times, from US$ 96 billion to US$ 6,243 billion and during the same period, overall 
manufacturers’ exports demonstrated a remarkable increase from US$ 41 billion to US$ 
4,630 billion (WTO, 2002). 
 
 
Introduction to the Iranian economy 
 
Iran’s economy is very much dependent upon crude oil and therefore each change in 
oil price is reflected in Iranian macroeconomic data. Such dependency (and in particular 
a fall in the price of oil) has led to a number of decisions to postpone development 
programmes, which were initially proposed by the Iranian Government. Approximately 
91% of Iran exports are natural resources and 75-80% (by value) of overall exports is 
oil. In 2004, by the order of Ayatollah Khamenayee (the target Leader of Islamic 
Republic of Iran), the Iranian Government prepared a strategic perspective for economic 
development, which promoted economic diversification in an attempt to reduce this 
single export product dependency.  
Other major concerns of the Iranian economy are unemployment and inflation. The 
official unemployment rate in 2004 was approximately 15-17% and the inflation rate 
14% (unemployment rate for youth, age 15-29 was approximately 31% and is 
anticipated to reach 50% in 2006). 
The Iranian transport sector has been performing well in all areas in recent years. For 
example, Shaheed Rejaee – a major container port, handled 1,151,989 TEU in 2003 and 
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it is expected that after a development programme is completed, the container capacity 
will reach 2.5 million TEU. Current trends also predict that the port will be able to 
handle 3.5 million TEU by 2010. Overall, Iranian ports attracted more ships in 2003, as 
they reduced their tariffs and improved their efficiency and performance levels. The 
current achievements confirm the positive development trends and increasing container 
capacity and transit expansion are setting high expectations for 2010 (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Iran: Ports and Main Rail Links. 
Source: http://web.archive.org/web/20040211212148/www.irirw.com/erailinfo/maps/rainetwork.htm. 
 
 
The potential of the Iranian route for EU-ASEAN trade 
 
The European Union (EU) is the world’s greatest trade area in volume; in 2001, the 
EU’s share of world trade was 41.54% (US$ 1.2 billion). More than 60% of this was 
intra-EU trade but the international EU-world trade remained a significant proportion.  
As opposed to the long-established EU, the ASEAN region (Association of South 
East Asian Nations) emerged in 1967 and is a non-unitized trade area. The members are 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
The main income of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, Korea) countries comes 
from manufactured goods and international trade. On its own, the ASEAN countries 
were responsible for 5% of all world trade in 2001; however ASEAN+3 constituted 
23% and 25% of world trade in 2001 and 2002 respectively (World Bank, 2003). The 
overall merchandise trade in 2001 between EU and ASEAN+3 was US$ 466 billion.  
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In May 2004 ten new countries joined the EU many from Eastern Europe, and 
because of resulting change in EU borders, the Iranian route has gained advantages over 
the traditional ocean shipping route. First of all, the change of borders made the average 
distance between Iran and the EU shorter and secondly, because industrial centres are 
likely to develop more quickly in the new East European member states of the EU, the 
cost of transportation from ASEAN to EU will decrease using an Iran transit route 
especially compared with the traditional shipping route. This process of industrial 
repositioning in the EU towards the eastern periphery will be exacerbated by the lower 
labour costs of the region and this in turn makes alternative Far East – EU transport 
links (including that via Iran) more viable. 
 
 
Transportation and maritime trends 
 
Transportation as a part of the integrated global supply chain is affected by many 
variables that lie both inside and outside the sector itself. The international trade 
environment is one of the most significant of these variables and with its continuous 
growth in recent years, the transport industry has experienced the need to supply ever 
increasing numbers and quality of services in all areas of the world. From the 
internationally exporting manufacturers’ point of view, transportation is an unavoidable 
part of the total manufacturing cost of their product. Considerable efforts are 
continuously made to reduce such costs, mainly because imported goods have to 
compete with locally manufactured goods not only in terms of quality but also perhaps 
more importantly, price. Nonetheless, the perception about transportation changed 
drastically during 1990s. A large number of logistics companies emerged, which 
provided not only transportation solutions, but also marketing, sourcing and other 
business supporting operations. Such companies started to offer value-added services in 
the supply chain and it was no longer viewed as a part of the production cost.  
The development of multimodal transportation and the formation of improved 
transport corridors can also be viewed as variables in the global supply chain. Numerous 
developments in transportation technology and industry’s need to introduce Just-In-
Time delivery services (JIT) raised the profile of multimodal transport solutions 
(Rodrigue, 2003). The formation of improved transportation corridors to enhance the 
capabilities of the transport industry to deliver JIT services was a consequence of 
developments during this period. 
In response, the ports and shipping industry found it necessary to react in order to 
improve their services and gain or retain business. Containerization became the leading 
edge within much of the maritime trade and developed rapidly in terms of capacity – 
vessels and terminals got bigger and more efficient within a relatively short period of 
time. The growth in capacity imposed new requirements upon the industry and a new 
type of collaboration emerged - mergers and strategic alliances (Evangelista and 
Morvillo, 1999). Shipping alliances control approximately 85% of container trade and 
are made up of all of the major liner shipping companies (Cario, 2002). These alliances 
link maritime and inland transportation systems creating economy of scale benefits. In 
turn this has meant that as container ships increased in size, they had access to only 
certain ports and this trend was exacerbated by the development of hub and spoke liner 
feeder systems with large vessels serving a few strategic ports and a number of smaller 
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vessels serving many other ports. The result was a division of ports into global hubs, 
regional hubs, sub-regional and local ports (World Bank, 2002), depending on their 
facilities and the hinterland they serve. In spite of what this classification suggests, each 
port still operates as a distribution centre (albeit of a different scale) within the global 
container supply chain.  
In this context, most of the container traffic from the ASEAN+3 countries passing to 
Europe is transported using traditional ocean shipping routes. However, the global 
supply chain network and the needs of modern JIT means that alternative arrangements 
for such cargo are continuously assessed in logistical terms and the Iranian route has 
been identified as having potential to re-route some of this traffic away from the 
traditional ocean shipping network, utilizing hub ports in Iran to trans-ship containers 
onto a multi-modal rail network with access to East Europe and the countries of the 
Former Soviet Union, possibly both at lower costs and in a shorter time (see Figure 2 
for main ports and rail links in Iran). 
 
 
Container trade 
 
Since 1990, container transportation growth has exceeded the growth of overall 
maritime trade (ESCAP/UNDP, 2001). In 2001 ESCAP published a long term Regional 
Shipping and Port Development Strategy, which predicted container trade developments 
until 2011. The world’s container throughput in 2011 is expected to be approximately 
122 million TEU and the distribution of the trade is presented in Table 1. The project 
stressed that Asia (South East and China) and Europe will be the most important regions 
in terms of container trade in the future and therefore will show the highest growth 
potential for long-distance container movements. 
In 1998, 4.18 million TEU were transported between the Far East and Europe, but by 
1999 the volume had increased to 4.25 million TEU. According to ESCAP, the 
container growth rate projection shows that total container traffic in 2011 on the 
traditional shipping route between Asia and Europe will reach 18 million TEU.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of container volumes in 2011. 
Region Market share 
Europe 22% 
North America 14% 
Latin America 7% 
Middle East 3% 
Africa 4% 
ANZ/Pacific 2% 
East Asia 23% 
North Asia 10% 
South East Asia 11% 
South Asia 4% 
Total 100% 
Sources: ESCAP (2001), Regional shipping and port development policy, p23. 
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With such a large growth in container movements forecast it is reasonable to presume 
that the opportunities for modal and route changes would also exist and in the light of 
this it is possible that some of this container traffic could be diverted to the rail-based 
Iranian route utilizing traditional shipping between the Far East and Iran and then rail 
links through Russia to access markets in the FSU and Eastern Europe. This would save 
considerable sailing distance by traditional ocean shipping routes passing through the 
Suez Canal and around the continent of Europe and as a consequence considerable 
costs. Table 2 presents some tentative indications of the potential for this route based 
around container handling capacity until 2011.  
 
Table 2: Potential container handling capacity of the Iranian route (million TEU). 
Year Europe-Asia Asia-Europe Total 
2004 5.93 5.83 11.76 
2005 6.23 6.21 12.53 
2006 6.73 6.61 13.34 
2007 7.13 7.01 14.14 
2008 7.56 7.43 15 
2009 8.01 7.87 15.88 
2010 8.5 8.34 16.86 
2011 9 8.85 17.85 
Sources: ESCAP (2001), Regional shipping and port development policy, pp20-24. 
 
 
Scenario development 
 
Iran is geographically situated in a strategic location mid-way within major East-West 
and North-South trade routes and is relatively close to the border of an enlarged EU, a 
factor given more emphasis by the prospect of entry of Bulgaria and Romania by 2008 
at the latest and Turkey some time after this. Iran therefore possesses the potential to 
provide a cheaper and quicker alternative to the traditional ocean-shipping based liner 
route from the Far East to Europe, and in this way diversifying and enhancing its own 
economy whilst also further integrating itself within the international global supply 
chain. 
The scenario is developed using a series of basic variables, which in this case consist 
of a number of inter-related themes that together form a future contextual environment 
for the Far East – Europe container trade and the route choice to be made within this. 
The dominant features of this scenario are those that are represented by the transport 
elements rather than the external variables that may have some impact. These were 
chosen as their influence upon the market is sizeable and it is the cost of transportation 
which forms one of the most significant influences upon route and modal choice 
(Banister, 2000). 
The most influential themes for this scenario are those related to the geographical, 
technical and financial/economy issues (Bavarsad, 1997). Geographical-based themes 
were developed in terms of costs and time required for cargo movement; technical 
themes related to the facility requirements; and the financial/economy themes were 
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developed in terms of costs of the construction/reconstruction of facilities required for 
cargo storage and movement.  
The Far East – European freight market can be divided into four sections for the 
purposes of analysis of the potential that the Iranian land route offers. This will provide 
the opportunity to make comparisons with the ocean shipping route which, apart from a 
small number of containers that travel by the Trans-Siberian Railway, dominates the 
market (Pasukeviciute et. al., 2005). 
The first section (shown as Segment 1 in Figure 3 – The Ocean Segment) can be 
defined as the stretch from the Malacca Strait (Singapore) to Bandar Abbas, the major 
Iranian container port located in the south of Iran. This section would only involve 
maritime transportation and apart from the port call in Iran, already constitutes the first 
stage of the existing shipping route. 
The second section – termed the ‘Iranian segment’ (Segment 2) is an inland route 
from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Indian Ocean to Amirabad, a port located 
on the coast of the Caspian Sea, in the north of Iran. Containers would be trans-shipped 
at Bandar Abbas and then transported using railway and road links across Iran.  
The third sector – termed the ‘Caspian Sea segment’ (Segment 3) would involve 
movement of containers by ship across the Caspian Sea, from Amirabad to Astarakhan 
or Lagan, both Russian ports on the north coast of the Caspian Sea. 
The fourth and final sector is the ‘European segment’ (Segment 4) and would involve 
land (rail and road) transportation from Astarakhan or Lagan to Eastern Europe and 
countries of the Former Soviet Union thus avoiding the long sea voyage through the 
Mediterranean and English Channel, or the shorter but still largely unnecessary trans-
shipment through South European ports such as Trieste and then onward movement by 
land. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Proposed Iran route for far East - European trade. 
Source: Map section from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/world_pol_2004.pdf. 
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Spatial comparisons between the route options 
 
In terms of the spatial and economic issues, the alternative proposed Iranian route will 
now be compared with the traditional ocean shipping route which is used for the large 
majority of container movements at present, in order to assess its advantages in terms of 
both transportation time and cost. Table 3 presents the characteristics of both routes. It 
is important to note that a number of assumptions have been made in order to finalize 
the scenario; for example the distance in kilometres is provided assuming that cargo 
arriving via both routes is destined for the industrial regions of Eastern-Northern Europe 
which includes in particular the new Member States of the EU of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia but excluding 
Cyprus and Malta as it is the East European region that offers most potential for the 
Iranian land route option. No attempt has been made to include the markets in the 
Former Soviet Union of central Asia, the Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, Georgia or 
Moldova at this stage but their potential for being linked by this new routing should be 
noted. The opportunities afforded by Trans Siberian rail linkages should also be noted 
here as another alternative to the traditional ocean shipping route. 
Table 3: Comparison of the traditional shipping route and the Iranian route. 
 
 
 
Ship Size in 
TEU 
 
Average speed  
  
Cost   
(in US$) 
 
Length 
(km) 
 
Time 
(days) 
700-1,000 22.2 knots  200-700 6 Ocean segment 
1,200 24.2 knots  200-700 4,270 5 
Iranian segment      
Rail 27.3 km/h 210 3  
Road 
 
 60 km/h 600 1,795 1.5 
      
Caspian segment  Non container 
ship 
22 knots 600 1,250 1-2 
      
European segment      
 Rail x 41 km/h 520 4,369 5-6 
      
Total Iranian route      
Sea-Rail 1,530-2,030 16  
Sea-Road 
 
 
 
 1,920-2,420 11,684 14 
      
3,000-4,000 22.2 knots 1,370 20,250 27 Traditional shipping route 
4,000+ 24.2 knots 1,370 20,250 26 
Sources: Transit (2002), Iran Transit Symposium, TTO, Behnami Pub, pp68-72; Asadi, (2004), Director 
of Caspian Shipping Company, Interview; UNCTAD, (2002), Review of Maritime Transport 2002, p60. 
 
It can be clearly seen in Table 3, that the Iranian route has significant advantages in 
terms of transportation time and distance as it could reduce the journey time by up to 
40%. However under the present circumstances it is likely to be more expensive 
especially because it involves multi border-crossings. In terms of costs, in the longer 
term they could be reduced by implementing changes such as operating bigger container 
ships for the Far East – Iran, Ocean and Caspian Sea segments and upgrading port 
facilities to enable them to handle these larger ships. The latter would particularly relate 
to the Caspian Sea ports, where significant investment would be required but which 
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might be justified if the new Iranian route could attract sufficient container traffic from 
this market. It was estimated that the price per container transported via the Iranian 
route would drop from US$ 2,455 to US$ 1,855 (using rail transport only) and from 
US$ 2,895 to US$ 2,295 (using both – rail and road transport) if these vessel and port 
economies of scale were achieved. These cost economies were based upon an 
assumption of 4000TEU ships for the Caspian Sea section (as well as the Indian Ocean) 
and development of the container terminals in Amirabad and Astarakhan to handle the 
larger ships.  
 
 
Technical issues 
 
Container handling efficiency in ports depends on a large number of variables the 
majority of which are technically based although those associated with organizational 
and administrative issues should not be under-estimated.  
The technical issues which are important in terms of the proposed Iranian route focus 
in particular upon container port operations. There are main three phases following 
departure from the origin in the Far Eastern port. In the first phase cargo is shifted from 
ship to shore; in the second phase cargo is moved to a container apron; and in the third 
phase cargo is loaded onto the inland vehicle (truck or train). At the final destination, 
whichever route is used, there is of course a final transfer. In order to provide efficient 
services, the port requires modern gantry cranes for the first phase of the operation, 
quay(s) and apron space for the second, and some form of container crane/vehicle for 
the final stage. 
According to the World Bank survey of port infrastructure, Iranian ports need to have 
the following facilities for the future:  
 
• Quay length of 300-320m and port channel depth of 18-20m 
• Gantry crane performance of 35-45 moves per hour and 22 hours of operation 
daily (281,000-361,000 moves per year) 
• Total container waiting time in transit area less than 3 days 
• Trailer turnaround time less than 30 minutes 
• 4 to 5 gantry cranes with capacity of handling 800,000 TEU per year 
• Capacity to handle 5000 TEU ships 
 
These minimum requirements set the parameters for the proposed Iranian container 
landbridge link which this paper discusses.  
 
 
Capacity calculations for potential demand 
 
There were two possible scenarios considered in this case. First of all, in the case of 
10% of the potential transit cargo from the Far East to Europe handled through Iranian 
ports and then trans-shipped onto the Iranian route this would amount to approximately 
180,000 TEU per year at the current level of demand. Secondly, if demand for the 
Iranian route was to increase to a highly optimistic 50% this would amount to 900,000 
TEU per year. Table 4 presents calculations for the required facilities for this level of 
demand based on the World Bank standards noted above. 
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Table 4: Estimation of required facilities, based on potential demand. 
Potential demand  10% 50% 100% 
Cranes  20ft 6 28 56 
 40ft 3 14 28 
Quays  3 5 10 
Transtainers 20ft 18 84 168 
 40ft 9 42 84 
Trucks 20ft 60 280 560 
 40ft 60 280 560 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
Economic issues 
 
In this section the economic issues related to operating a specific container terminal 
largely dedicated to the Iranian route trade are calculated based on prices gathered from 
local and regional sources and the World Bank. Details are shown in Table 5 using the 
scenario assumptions made earlier. 
Table 5: Total cost estimation for a new Bandar Abbas container terminal (mUS$). 
Facilities 10% Market 
Share 
10% Market 
Share 
50% Market 
Share 
50% Market 
Share 
 20’ 40’ 20’ 40’ 
Quay (metres) 900 900 4500 4500 
Quay (cost)  140 140 700 700 
Gantry crane (number) 6 3 28 14 
Gantry crane (cost)  3.6 1.8 168.0 84.0 
Transtainer (number) 18 9 84 42 
Transtainer (cost)  7.2 3.6 33.6 16.8 
Other costs  100 100 150 150 
Truck costs 8.4 8.4 39.2 39.2 
TOTAL 291.6 270.0 1090.8 990.0 
Source: Authors. 
 
Meanwhile further calculations were aimed at assessing the transport costs of the new 
route and were based upon a number of additional assumptions to those made earlier: 
 
• In terms of the Ocean segment (Far East – Bandar Abbas), Iranian interests have 
a serious chance of gaining some of the income from this segment in addition to 
benefits from cargo handling in Bandar Abbas. 
• The port operation part of the Caspian Sea segment will be undertaken entirely 
by Iranian interests but the shipping element might be undertaken by a non-
Iranian party. 
• Within the Iranian segment, all activities will be undertaken by Iranian interests. 
 
Table 6 show the operational costs for each segment based upon these assumptions 
and from this, plausible income scenarios can be derived. Table 7 shows these income 
scenarios transporting a TEU using the Iran route. 
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Table 6: TEU Cost for the Iranian scenario route (US$ per TEU). 
Route 
Segment Caspian Sea Segment Iranian Segment Ocean Segment 
Operation Shipping Port Rail Road Shipping Port 
Cost (US$) 250 100 210 650 450 100 
Source: Authors. 
 
Table 7: Estimation of total income for the Iranian scenario route (US$ per TEU). 
Caspian Sea Segment Iranian Segment Ocean Segment 
 
Shipping Port Rail Road Shipping Port 
 250 100 210 650 450 100 
Total Income 
Minimum 
Income 0 100 210 650 0 100 410 850 
Maximum 
Income 250 100 210 650 450 100 1110 1550 
Source: Authors. 
NB. Shaded cells refer to a 20’ container. 
 
 
 
The total Iranian Route scenario income can now be derived from the potential 
demand that has been identified. Here the calculations are based upon each of the 
previous assumptions with the results displayed in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Total income of scenario based on each portion of potential demand. 
Maximum  
(million US$) 
Minimum  
(million US$) Potential Demand (Mln TEU) 
2790 1998 1530 738 1.8 10% Potential Demand 
13950 9990 7650 3690 9 50% Potential Demand 
Source: Authors. 
NB. Shaded cells refer to a 20’ container. 
 
 
The total Iranian Route scenario income, assuming 10% of containers are diverted 
from the traditional ocean shipping route, is US$738-1530 million (minimum) rising to 
a maximum of US$1998-2790 million. The minimum expected revenue following a 
10% container diversion would be US$ 1134million, US$ 2394million maximum, 
taking the mean of the calculations as the most likely outcome. 
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Scenario obstacles 
 
For each scenario a number of practical obstacles could be identified. In this final 
phase of scenario planning these issues are considered under the categories of 
geographical, technical, economic and methodological. 
 
 
Geographical obstacles 
 
These are summarised in Table 9 with obstacles to the development of the Iranian 
Route divided into the geographical segments identified earlier. 
 
 
Technical obstacles 
 
A number of technical weaknesses can be identified. In particular these can be 
associated with the performance of Iranian port terminals in terms of capacity and 
productivity. 
 
 
Economic obstacles 
 
These particularly focus upon uncertainties in stability in Iranian financial sources. 
These issues stem in particular from the country’s economic dependency upon natural 
resources – in other words oil. There has also been a lack of transportation infrastructure 
investment for many years which needs to reposition the country within the global 
supply chain. 
 
Table 9: Geographical obstacles to the Iranian route. 
Segment Weaknesses Reasons 
Ocean Segment High cost of maritime 
transportation. 
No large container ships serving the segment. 
Low efficiency performance of Iranian ports. 
An imbalance of ship capacity on the line. 
Currently no Iranian port of call by the liner 
alliances. 
Iranian Segment Insufficient capacity and 
quality of Iranian land 
transportation. 
No high speed cargo train. 
High average age of technical facilities both 
by rail and road. 
Caspian Segment Low performance of 
ports. 
Lack of container terminal facilities and 
appropriate vessels. 
European Segment Low capacity of some 
segments of the route. 
Single track rail for some segments of route. 
Rail gauge incompatibilities. 
Multi-border crossing.  
Source: Authors. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Iranian economy can grow and diversify by identifying and utilising the 
opportunities which are increasingly offered by the process of global change. Long held 
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comparative advantages no longer can be seen as permanent and there has been a 
notable move towards dynamic advantage in international supply chain management. 
The Iranian economy can take advantage of these changes by planning to enter the Far 
East - European container transport market and acting as a landbridge as an alternative 
to the shipping route through the Suez Canal and Mediterranean Sea. 
Scenario planning as a strategic tool can help decision-makers to plan for the future 
helping them use their creativity for picturing possible alternative solutions. The 
scenario presented in this paper would aid the Iranian national economy to overcome a 
number of obstacles some related to economic diversification, others associated with 
integrating modern supply chain management processes into the country and facilitating 
the exploitation of Iran’s landbridge geographical position. Only 10% of the potential 
demand for this route would create revenues up to 30% of total non-oil exports. There is 
a great opportunity for Iran in this growing market but one so far which they have failed 
to gain access to. 
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